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ABSTRACT
A tax on vehicle emissions can efficiently induce all of the cheapestforms of abatement.
Consumers could drive less, buy a smaller car with better gas mileage, usecleaner gasoline, and
repair pollution control equipment (PCE). However,the technology is not yet available to measure
and tax each car's total emissions. We thus investigate alternative instruments.In a simple model
with identical consumers, we show conditions under which the same efficiency canbe attained by
the combination of a tax on gas, a tax on engine size ,anda subsidy to PCE. In a model with
heterogeneous consumers, the same efficiency can againbe obtained, but only if each person's
gasoline tax rate can be made to depend on the characteristicsof the car. We solve for these first-
best tax rates. Assuming that tax rates must be uniform across consumers, wethen characterize
second-best tax rates on gasoline and on characteristics.
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Continued growth of cities, increases in vehicle-miles traveled, and Americans'
renewed love for large vehicles contribute to increasing externalities from vehicle
emissions, including worsened health, diminished visibility, and possible global
warming. Technological advances in the measurement of car emissions renew hope
that a tax can be levied directly on these emissions (Harrington, et al., 1994). If so,
individuals would reduce pollution efficiently (Pigou, 1932). At least for the time
being, however, the emissions taxes or permits that work well for stationary sources
such as electric generating plants are not considered feasible for mobile sources of
pollution. The technology is not available to measure the emissions of each vehicle in a
way that is cost-effective and reliable, that is resistant to tampering by the vehicle's
owner, and that satisfies legal restrictions against the search of a private vehicle. In this
paper, we investigate alternative market incentives for the reduction of car pollution.
We focus on economic incentives because these kinds of policies "tend to be
less costly than approaches which regulate the technology of the car or the fuel"
(Harrington, et aL, 1994: p. 16).' If a true Pigovian tax on vehicle emissions were
available, it would reduce pollution by inducing households to drive fewer miles, to buy
fuel-efficient cars, to install pollution control equipment (PCE), to purchase cleaner
fuel, to avoid cold start-ups, and perhaps to drive less aggressively.2 Thus, any efficient
alternative policy would need to induce the same behavior. In this paper, we investigate
combinations of other policies that would influence people to buy smaller cars, better
pollution control equipment, and cleaner fuel with lower volatility or higher levels of
oxygenation. Moreover, a true Pigovian tax would automatically account for consumer
1Foran estimate of the cost savings from the use of incentive instruments rather than mandates, see Kling
(1994), For a review of such studies, see Bohm and Russell (1985). Many researchers evaluate costs of
current air pollution or the costs and benefits of abatement due to new vehicle and fuel technologies
(Faiz, et al., 1996; Hall, et al., 1992; Kahn, 1996a; Kazimi, 1997; Krupnick and Portney, 1991; Krupnick
and Walls, 1992; Small and Kazimi, 1995). Others focus on the effects of command and control (CAC)
policies such as emissions requirements and Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards
(Goldberg, 1998; Harrington, 1997; Kahn, 1996b).
2Because of cold-start up emissions, Burmich (1989) finds that a 5-mile trip has almost three times the
emissions per mile as a 20-mile trip at the same speed. Sierra Research (1994) finds that a car driven
aggressively has a carbon monoxide emissions rate that is almost 20 times higher than when driven
normally.-2-
heterogeneity.For example, the driver of a dirty car would pay more tax than the driver
of a clean car, for the same miles.
Our specific question is whether a combination of taxes on gasoline and on cars
can achieve this efficient outcome. It is an example of the general problem in public
economics regarding the optimal correction of externalities in the face of heterogeneity.
To determine the form of these efficient policy combinations, we model the
household choice of miles, vehicle attributes, pollution control equipment (PCE), fuel
cleanliness, and other goods. Initially, we clarify our basic framework using a model of
homogeneous consumers. We then allow consumers to differ by income and by two
taste parameters, one for miles and the other for vehicle size. We use our model of
heterogeneous consumers to find closed-form solutions for a first-best gas tax that
depends on the vehicle, and a tax on the vehicle that depends on miles driven. Since
these measurements may be too costly, we derive conditions that characterize second-
best optimal uniform tax rates. We then discuss how these optimal uniform tax and
subsidy rates may depend on the joint distribution of tastes for miles and engine size.3
This paper builds upon a large literature pertaining to vehicle emissions, but it
also builds upon a different body of literature pertaining to other types of emissions
when a Pigovian tax is not available. Eskeland and Devarajan (1996) show how
different combinations of policies can be used to approach the effect of a Pigovian tax.
Fullerton (1997) introduces a "two-part instrument" and shows how it can exactly
match the effects of a Pigovian tax on industrial emissions, at least in a simple model
with homogeneous firms and consumers. As shown in Fullerton and Wolverton (1999),
a tax on output is equivalent to a tax on all inputs, including both clean inputs and dirty
inputs (emissions). Then this tax is returned as a subsidy to all inputs except emissions.
In this way, emissions remain the sole taxed input.
Optimal tax results are derived here analytically, using general functional forms. h a later paper,
Fullerton and West (1999) assign specific functional forms, use a large sample of households, simulate
second-best policies, and compare welfare gains as a percentage of the gain from the ideal-but-
unavailable Pigovian tax.-3-
The vehicle emission literature also struggles with the special information
problems associated with pollution.4 For example, Eskeland (1994) builds a simple
general equilibrium model with homogeneous consumers and fixed abatement
mandates, and he then fmds the additional welfare-improving tax on gasoline.
Harrington, et a!. (1998) consider the cost-effectiveness of a mandated vehicle
inspection and maintenance (JIM) program compared to an incentive program under
conditions of uncertainty. The incentive is a fee that is based on the vehicle's emission
rate,assumingmiles are not observable. Thus, motorists can reduce their fee by
repairing their vehicle, but not by driving less. Sevigny (1998) incorporates the choice
of miles with a second-best emissions tax, but this tax requires knowledge of each
vehicle's average emissions per mile and the accurate measurement of miles traveled.5
Since our paper provides a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
consumers who can choose miles and car characteristics, it is most similar to the
existing paper by Innes (1996). He also analyzes first-best and second-best
combinations of feasible policy instruments. We state below where some of our results
confirm those of Innes, but we also show how some other results differ in ways that can
be attributed to assumptions employed in each model. Because of the recent increase in
consumers' affinity for large vehicles, we focus on engine size as one important
determinant of emissions.6 Thus our model differs from Innes in three respects. First,
example, Kohn (1996) shows that any combination of a tax on vehicle emissions and a subsidy to
emissions abatement are equivalent, For any such combination to be administered, however, emissions
must be measurable. Train, et al. (1997) analyze "feebates," in which rebates are provided to vehicles
with higher-than-average fuel efficiency and fees are levied on less efficient vehicles. These feebates are
feasible incentives because fuel efficiency can be measured, but they are not perfectly efficient because
they do not depend on miles driven.
All of these schemes are imperfect. Emissions per mile (EPM) cannot be measured perfectly, because it
depends on how the car is driven. Miles cannot be measured perfectly, because drivers can roll back the
odometer. Harrington et a! (1994) discuss remote sensing at a selection of locations as a good
approximation, but some drivers may disproportionately miss or intentionally avoid those locations. Our
schemes are not perfect either, as they miss some behaviors mentioned above (cold start-ups, aggressive
driving).
6CurrentClean Air Act regulations impose the same restrictions on all cars, so new-vehicle emissions
vary by engine size only because of weaker regulations for trucks and sport utility vehicles (SIJV). Light
trucks and SLJVs are "one out of every two family vehicles sold," and will be the "fastest growing source
of global warming gases in the United States over the next decade" (Bradsher, l997,p. A24). In addition,
actual subsequent emissions rates may vary by engine size, even within a vehicle class.-4-
weallow consumer heterogeneity in terms of two different taste parameters (for miles
andforengine size). Second, we write explicit expressions for miles per gallon (MPG)
and emissions per mile (EPM) that are functions of engine size and other car
characteristics. Third, we derive closed-form solutions for first-best tax rates on
gasoline, engine size, and PCE.
In a simple model with homogeneous consumers, we fmd that the effects of a
first-best Pigovian tax on emissions can be replicated perfectly by a three-part
instrument with tax rates on gasoline, engine size, and PCE. In a model with
heterogeneity, however, the first best requires that the gasoline tax depend on engine
size and that the tax on size depend on miles driven. Such rates may not be feasible, so
we solve for conditions that characterize the second-best uniform rate of tax on gasoline
(for all vehicles) and on engine size (for any mileage). This model presents
policymakers with complicated conditions for setting these second best tax rates, so we
then investigate easier approaches. In particular, we investigate the bias from the
simple but erroneous assumption that consumers are homogeneous and that all drive the
mean number of miles in the mean sized car (using the closed-form expressions for
first-best tax rates, evaluated at mean miles and engine size). As it turns out, this bias
depends on convexity of MPG and EPM as functions of engine size, and on the
correlation in consumer preferences for desired miles and engine size. Preliminary
evidence suggests that both MPG and EPM are convex, and that therefore the erroneous
assumption of homogeneity would understate the desired second-best uniform tax on
gasoline. On the other hand, preliminary evidence suggests that miles and engine size
are negatively correlated and that therefore the erroneous assumption of homogeneity
would overstate the desired second-best uniform tax on engine size.
L Homogeneous Consumers
In this section, we use a simple model of homogeneous consumers to exposit the
basic characteristics of a first-best policy package. This model provides three main
insights into the problem of controlling vehicle pollution. First, this model shows a case
in which a three-part instrument is equivalent to a Pigovian tax on car emissions. This-5-
policy package includes taxes on gasoline and "size" and a subsidy to a "clean-car
characteristic." Second, if emissions per mile depend on clean-fuel characteristics, a
subsidy to such attributes is not necessary as long as the gas tax can depend on the
amount of this attribute. Third, consumers may or may not derive utility from the
clean-car or clean-fuel characteristic. If not, the government would have to subsidize
consumers by 100 percent of the cost of the clean characteristic (such as PCE or fuel
additives) in order to influence them to buy any of it. Moreover, because consumers are
then indifferent between buying and not buying the clean good, the quantity purchased
is indeterminate. These are the reasons that Innes (1996) includes mandates for cleaner
fuel in his optimal second-best policy package.7
The homogeneous-consumer model is constructed in the spirit of Baumol and
Oates (1988), as extended by Fullerton and Wolverton (1999). For this exposition, we
simplify the analysis by assuming that information is perfect, lump-sum taxes are
available, and the only market failure is a negative externality from emissions. This is a
general equilibrium model, but a simple one where production prices are fixed (and
consumer prices vary with tax rates). The economy consists of n identical households,
each of which owns one vehicle. Each vehicle is made up of characteristics that affect
emissions such as engine size, fuel efficiency, and PCE, and characteristics that do not
affect emissions (such as leather seats or a sunroof). Households buy gasoline in order
to drive miles, and they choose among grades of fuel-cleanliness.
Households gain utility from driving miles m ,the"size" of the vehicle s, and
a composite-commodity, x. Broadly interpreted, s represents any vehicle
characteristic that gives households utility and that increases emissions per mile. More
specifically, we can define s to be a measure of engine size such as cubic inches of
displacement (CID). Also, consumers may gain or lose utility from pollution-control
equipment, c, and per-gallon fuel cleanliness, f. Pollution-control equipment includes
catalytic converters and other emissions-reducing equipment directly installed on a
vehicle. In general, this c should reflect the condition as well as the amount of PCE.
We ignore existing mandates in the theoretical model below, but we recognize that these mandates
affect the estimated ways in which actual emissions per mile depend on engine size and other car
characteristics. Thus, incentive policies may work because they encourage purchase of regulated cars.-6-
Fuelcleanliness is an attribute of gasoline such as volatility or oxygenation.8 We
assume that cleaner fuel is more expensive. The composite commodity consists of all
vehicle characteristics not related to emissions and all other goods purchased by the
consumer. In addition, household utility is affected by aggregate auto emissions, E.
Thus the household's utility function is:
u=u(m,s,c,f,x,E) (1)
The emissions per mile (EPM) that a car discharges depends positively on size
and negatively on PCE and the clean-fuel characteristic. Thus EPM =EPM(s,c, f).
Since each of the n households drives m miles, aggregate emissions E can be
calculated by nmEPM(s,c,f). Next, fuel efficiency is measured in miles per gallon
(MPG) and depends on engine size and the quantity of the clean-car good on the
vehicle,10 so MPG =MPG(s,c).Cars with larger engines get lower gas mileage, so
MPGS MPG/ösisnegative. The addition of a clean-car characteristic such as a
catalytic converter adds weight to a vehicle, diminishing fuel efficiency, and therefore
MPGC is also likely to be negative.1'
8Morevolatile gasolme leads to more evaporative emissions. The addition of oxygenates to gasoline
alters the stoichiometric air/fuel ratio. Provided the carburetor setting is unchanged, this alteration may
reduce emissions of carbon monoxide (CO) and hydrocarbons (HC), but can also increase emissions of
oxides of nitrogen (NOX). And, if the mixture becomes too lean (high air/fuel), HC emissions can
increase due to misfiring (OECD, 1995).
Driver utility may also be affected by the age of the vehicle, and vintage is an important determinant of
emissions. For simplicity, in this paper, we ignore vintage and thus the possibility of a subsidy to
newness. Adding vintage is straightforward, and it yields a newness subsidy analogous to the size tax
below (see Fullerton and West, 1999).
efficiency may also be a function of the clean-fuel characteristic, f. Oxygenated fuel contains
methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) or ethanol, each of which have lower energy content per gallon than
conventional gasoline. For simplicity, we do not incorporate f into MPG. Instead, we provide intuitive
explanation of this effect when warranted.
According to Dunleep (1992), the addition of one cylinder decreases fuel efficiency by 3 percent. Also,
the equipment mandated in U.S. tier 1 emissions regulations lowers fuel efficiency by 1 percent.-7-
Consumers do not purchase m directly, but through the combination they
choose of gasoline (g), size (s), and the clean-car characteristic (c). In otherwords, the
demand for gasoline is a derived demand, where
m (2)
MPG(s, c)
Consumers incorporate these relationships when they decide what size car andhow
much gasoline will maximize their utility in equation (1) above.
Our research strategy is to solve the social planner's problem, then solve the
household's problem, and compare. We then find tax rates in the household's
optimization problem that induce households to behave in a waythat achieves the
outcome of the social planner's problem.
A. The Social Planner's Problem
The social planner maximizes the utility of the representative household, subject
to the household's income, y ,bychoosing m, s, c, f, and x. The social planner
recognizes that individuals' choices affect aggregate emissions. Inother words, the
social planner maximizes utility in equation (1) subject to equation (2) and a resource
constraint:




with respect to m, s, c, f, and x. The price per gallon of gasoline without any clean
characteristic is p, and the price per unit of the clean-fuel characteristic per gallonis
p. The total price of a gallon of gasolineis (pg+pj-f), and the private cost of driving a
mile is (pg-1-pjf)IMPG(s, c). The price of s is s, whichrepresents the price of adding
an additional cubic inch of displacement to an engine. The price perunit of the clean-
car characteristic is c ,andthe price of x is normalized to one.
12
Thismaximization yields first-order conditions in equations (4), shown in Table
I. Subscripts on u, EPM, and MPG indicate partial derivatives (Urn= öu/m),and 5
12Inpractice, in order to get constant production prices for s, c, and f, one coulddefine these variables
as deviations from their mean values.Table I: First-Order Conditions with Homogeneous Consumers
Equations (4) from the social planner's problem:
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u =4i+t} (6e)-8-
isthe marginal social value of income. The quantity in brackets in (4a) is the total
implicit price of a mile, while the quantity in brackets in (4b) is the overall cost per unit
of size, including the extra amount that must be paid for miles due to the lower MPG
caused by the incremental unit of s. Similarly, the quantity in brackets in (4c) is the
overall cost of PCE, including the extra amount that must be paid for miles due to the
lower MPG. In (4d), the term in brackets is the overall cost per unit of the clean-fuel
characteristic.
These first-order conditions say that the marginal social gain from driving
another mile or from an additional unit of s, c, f or x, is equal to the marginal social
cost of each respective good. The presence of the UEtermon the left-hand sides of
(4a-4d) reflects the effect on utility of the increment to aggregate emissions from
driving an additional mile, increasing vehicle size, adding PCE, or buying cleaner
gasoline.
B. The Household Problem
In contrast to the social planner, a household does not recognize that its own
choices affect aggregate emissions. However, it may face taxes or subsidies on its
consumption of s, c, f, x, and g. If it were available, a tax on emissions would enter
the budget constraint. The household optimization problem is to choose m, s, c ,f,
and x to maximize:
u(m,s,c,f,x,E) (5)
F((p +t +(p +t )f)'
MPG(s,c) 1n—(p5
+t)s—(p +tc)c—(l+tx)x—teEPM(s,c,f)m
In the budget constraint, tgisthe tax per gallon of gas, tJ-isthe tax per unit of clean-
fuel characteristic, tisthe tax per unit of size, tisthe tax per unit of PCE, tisthe
tax per unit of x, and teisthe tax per unit of emissions.
The first-order conditions for this problem are equations (6), also shown in
Table I. Emissions can be made to enter the consumer problem implicitly through the-9-
pollution tax te. The price per mile would then include the emissions tax per mile.
Similarly, the implicit prices of s, c, and f include the emissions tax associated with
the change in emissions.
C. Solutions
1. The Pigovian Tax
The tax on emissions, t, provides the basic efficient policy against which
alternatives can be compared. Suppose all other tax rates are set to zero (tgt1 = ts =
= t = 0). In this case, (4e) and (6e) imply A =ô.To equate the first order




We define the right-hand side as "marginal environmental damages" (MED) per unit of
emissions. It is the sum of all n households' disutilities from emissions, uE,
translated into money terms when divided by the marginal utility of income. This is the
usual Pigovian tax, and it is greater than zero so long as UE < 0. Using this value of te,
and A =5,then the first order condition (4b) matches (6b), (4c) matches (6c), and (4d)
matches (6d).
Thus the Pigovian tax on emissions by itself induces households to make all the
optimal choices. Because of the tax on emissions, consumers will drive fewer miles,
buy smaller cars, buy cleaner fuel, and install more pollution control equipment (or opt
for a vehicle model that is already equipped with better pollution control equipment).
2. Taxes on Gasoline and Size with a Subsidy to PCE
If the measurement of emissions were difficult or impossible, so that te = 0, we
can fmd a different policy combination that attains the exact same efficient outcome.
This policy is a three-part instrument that begins with a tax schedule for gasoline and is
complemented by a tax on size and a subsidy to PCE. For ease of exposition, we solve
for a subsidy on f and show how it can be incorporated into the gasoline tax. To solve
for the policy parameters, assume for the moment that c and f do enter household-10-
utility( u 0 and U1 0).Then,set tx= te = 0.Thus A still equals (5,and we
have equality between (4e) and (6e). Using A =(5,we can solve for the subsidy on the
clean-fuel characteristic by equating (4d) and (6d) to get:
='"EPM1MPG(s,c) (8)
This tax is negative (a subsidy) as long as emissions per mile decrease with an
incremental unit of clean-fuel characteristic. It equals the value of the emissions
reduction due to an additional unit of cleanliness per gallon, calculated as the damage
per unit of emissions (MED) times the change inemissions per mile (EPM1) times
miles per gallon (MPG).'3
To solve for the tax on gasoline, plug A =(5into (4a) and the clean-fuel subsidy
(8) into (6a). Then subtract (6a) from (4a) to obtain:
= EPM(s,c, f )MPG(s, c) +f EPMJfMPG(s, c) (9)
This tax on gasoline has two components. The first term is positive and represents the
additional damage caused by an increase of one gallon of gasoline. it is the damage per
unit emission (MED) times emissions per mile (EPM) times miles per gallon (MPG).
The second term is also positive. The dollar amount of this second term exactly
matches the dollar amount of the subsidy ft1 in equation (8), but we cannot just cancel
these terms and use only the first term in (9). In effect, a "deposit" is collected in the
gas tax, assuming a fixed "baseline" level of f, and then a"refund" or subsidy t1
encouragesthe individual to choose more fuel cleanliness f. Still, however, the
subsidy t1 is paid at the same time that tgiscollected, so the net result is a schedule
that we will call one instrument: a gas tax that depends on the cleanliness of that gas.
To obtain the tax on size, plug A =(5into (4b) and the clean-fuel subsidy (8) and
the gas tax (9) into (6b). Then subtract (6b) from (4b) to obtain:
'Ifthe clean-fuel characteristic negatively affects MPG, the clean-fuel subsidy in (8) would include a
positive second term, and the gas tax (below) would include an offsetting term (to leave only the direct
effect on emissions).-11-
t=_UEflm[EPM+EPM(s,c,f)MPG 1 (10) )[
S
MPG(s,c)j
Like the gas tax, the size tax has two components. The first term is -uEn/A(thatis,
MED) times the change in emissions per mile from a change in size (EPMS), times
miles (m). This gives the direct damage caused by an increase of one unit of size. This
term is positive as long as emissions affect utility negatively (UE< 0)and size affects
emissions positively (EPM> 0). The second term is an indirect effect from an
additional unit of size through its effect on fuel efficiency.'4 As long as MPGS <0, this
term is negative and is thus a rebate. Specifically, it is a rebate of part of the gas tax in
(9). Because an additional unit of size decreases fuel efficiency, the household knows
that an increase in the size of its vehicle's engine will cost additional gas tax. Thus part
of the external cost of size is already internalized by the gas tax. After this rebate, only
the cost of size that is separate from its effect on MPG remains taxed. Conceptually,
this rebate is the same as that which appears in Innes' second-best vehicle tax, where
that tax approximately equals the "predicted social costs of emissions, less the portion
of these costs that are internalized by the gasoline tax" (Innes, 1996: p. 212).
Because the two components of the size tax are opposite in sign, this theory does
not predict the sign of t. Since the right-hand term before the brackets is positive, the
sign of tisdetermined by the sign within the brackets. Thus the size tax is positive
whenever
EPM5 -MPG (11)
EPM(s, c, f) MPG(s, c)
These two terms are proportional effects of size on emissions per mile (EPM) and on
miles per gallon (MPG). When an additional unit of size brings about a larger
percentage change in emissions per mile than in fuel efficiency, the size tax is positive.
If emissions rise at the same rate that fuel efficiency deteriorates, then the size tax is
zero. If fuel efficiency deteriorates proportionally more than emissions increase, then
size is subsidized! In this last case, the gasoline tax more than completely internalizes
14Bothof these terms contain in, the "baseline" number of miles. This in is not the individual's own
choice of miles, or else the individual's first order condition (8a) would include the derivative of twith
respect to m.-12-
the impact of size on emissions. Empirical exploration of the relative effects in (11)
will uncover the sign of the size tax.'5
To solve for the tax on PCE, we follow similar procedures to obtain:
UEfl UEfl MPGC t = EPMin+ EPM(s,c,f)m (12)
MPG(s,c)
The tax on PCE is perfectly analogous to the size tax. The first term is negative to
reflect the effect on damages of an added unit of PCE. The second term is a rebate due
to the effect that PCE has on fuel efficiency (already internalized by the gas tax). Since
the second term is also negative, the sign of the clean-car tax is always negative. That
is, t is necessarily a subs jdy.'6
All of these tax rates together induce households to make socially optimal trade-
offs at the margin, so they are valid only for internal solutions. A more complete
analysis is required to deal with corner solutions.17 If households dislike pollution
control equipment enough (u <<0),then the subsidy in (12) may not induce them to
buy any of it. In this extreme case, the corner solution with c =0is indeed part of the
social optimum, even though the marginal conditions (6) are not satisfied. If
households care nothing about this equipment, however, then a different problem arises.
To see this, note that when u =0,the right-hand side of first order condition (6c) must
equal zero at the optimum. By assumption, for this analysis, the emissions tax is set
equal to zero. Therefore, to induce consumers to buy any pollution equipment, the
subsidy to PC'E (ta) must be equal to the entire private cost of PCE, including both the
direct cost of equipment, c, and the extra gasoline costs incurred due to the negative
15
Also,note that the size tax in (10) depends on the number of miles driven. Of course, in this model
with homogeneous consumers, all households drive the same type of vehicle the same number of miles
per year, and the size tax is the same for everyone. When we introduce heterogeneity in Section II, the
first-best solution requires that each household pay a size tax that reflects its own choice of miles.
16j cmeasures the amount of PCE installed, this subsidy could be paid upon purchase of the vehicle.
More generally, if c reflects the condition of the equipment as well as the amount, then this subsidy
could reward testing, maintenance, and repair of PCE.
17Wederived Kuhn-Tucker conditions from a model with non-negativity constraints on the purchase of
clean-car and clean-fuel characteristics. The results of that model include equations (9), (10) and (12) for
internal solutions and an inequality to characterize each corner solution. The additional intuition is
minimal, however, so we just outline these results in the text.-13-
effectthat PCE has on fuel efficiency. With a 100 percent subsidy, however, the choice
of c is indeterminate. Thus, if u =0,then incentives do not work. The optimal PCE
can only be achieved by a mandate (as in Innes, 1996).
The same analysis applies to the clean-fuel characteristic. When uj =0,the
right-hand side of (6d) must equal zero at the optimum. For households to choose
cleaner gas, the subsidy must equal the entire cost of the attribute, pj.
Individualsmay or may not gain utility from driving cleaner cars and using
cleaner fuel. People may like using the latest technologies, or feel peer pressure do so.
On the other hand, pollution control equipment may negatively affect performance by
increasing vehicle weight and decreasing acceleration. In addition, if cleaner fuel can
be found only in a limited number of locations, the inconvenience costs of refueling
could be high.
For these reasons, we think that U(andu1 are unlikely to be exactly zero. In
fact, these marginal utilities are likely to fall with the amount of c or f.Evenif u is
negative, a big enough subsidy can induce the household to buy more of this good, until
u on the left-hand side of (6c) falls to the level of the (negative) private marginal cost
on the right-hand side of (6c).
The optimality of these results also depends on our assumptions about the
available abatement technologies. Since emissions depend on EPM(s, c,f), the three-
part instrument (tg,t, t) attainsthe same first-best equilibrium as that reached by the
Pigovian tax. Despite the fact that emissions are never measured, the three-part policy
can attain 100 percent of the improvement in social welfare achieved by the Pigovian
tax.
II. Heterogeneous Consumers
The tax rates derived in the previous section are uniform across all consumers.
In this section, we introduce heterogeneity to see if and when the optimal tax rates need
to differ among consumers. If the emissions tax tewereavailable, we confirm that a-14-
singlete =MEDwould achieve the first-best social optimum (FBSO). If not, then
individual-specific tax rates on other goods can still achieve the FBSO. If policy is
unable to apply individual-specific tax rates, then it cannot achieve the FBSO.Wethen
characterize the second-best uniform tax rates that best approximate the unavailable tax
on emissions.
In his model of heterogeneous consumers, Innes (1996) allows households to
differ in terms of income and one taste parameter. In our model, we wish to allow
households to differ in terms of income and two taste parameters. We use the parameter
a to represent the household's preference for miles, and we use the parameter ft to
represent the preference for size of the car. Together with income, these parameters are
jointly distributed according to the distribution function h (a, ft, y) with positive
support on [a,&]x[i3,1x [y,y].The integral of this distribution over a ,ft,and y is
the population, n .Ina CES or Cobb-Douglas specification of utility, for example, a
could be the weight on miles, ft would be the weight on size, and (1- a -ft)would be
the weight on x. Our analysis is not limited to these special cases, however, and it is
not limited by any particular relationship between a and ft. Those who live far from
their place of work have a high demand for miles (a), but they may prefer either a small
car (for better gas mileage) or a large car (for comfort and safety). We show the
importance of the correlation between a and ft.
To focus on the issue of heterogeneity, we now ignore the clean-car and clean-
fuel characteristics. Thus fuel efficiency and emissions per mile depend only on size,
and each household generates ,nEPM(s) units of emissions. Aggregate pollution is thus
E = $JJm.EPM(s)h(a, f3,v)Jcxaf3y (13)
a$y
where choices of in and s are individual-specific. A household's utility function is
U=u[m,s,x;a,f3,y]—JJE (14)
where p is the household's change in welfare from an additional unit of pollution
(aU/oE). While we allow a and ft to differ among households, in order to analyze-15-
differentchoices and abatement costs, we are not concerned with differential benefits
from environmental protection. We thus assume .z is the same for all consumers.
A. The Social Planner's Problem
The social planner must maximize a measure of social welfare such as a
weighted sum of n households' utilities. To set up this problem, we must specify
weights. For present purposes, we want weights that meet three criteria. First, we want
to abstract from the welfare effects of any pure redistribution and focus instead on
comparing the efficiency of various policies. Therefore, we choose weights so that a
dollar given to any household has the same effect on social welfare. To achieve this
condition, we divide each household's utility by its own marginal utility of income (A)18
Second, when teisavailable, we want the maximization of our social welfare function
to yield the solution of Pigou (1932). Since this solution is based on marginal
conditions (such as marginal environmental damages) at the optimum, we use the
values for A that occur at the first-best social optimum (2*). Third, we want to be able
to compare policies using the same welfare weights. When first-best instruments are
not available, we want to be able to find second-best uniform tax rates that maximize
the same social welfare function. Therefore we use prices at the Pigovian equilibrium
to evaluate A *,andwe use those A *toget the weights (1/2*) for all subsequent
evaluations of other policies. The result is a money-metric measure of social welfare.
The social planner's problem is to maximize this welfare function subject to a
resource constraint (the integral over all individual budget constraints):
jj j [u[nis.
xl-j4J $ [mEPM(s)(a, fi, fi, y)a$y
(15) ay
-
MPG(S)in- ps x}(afl Y)Y]
18Toavoid redistributions in the tax rate problem below, we assume that all tax revenues are returned in
lump-sum fashion to the same consumer.-16-
withrespect to each consumer's in, s, and x (given their individual a, /1 and y). The
multiplier on the resource constraint is (5, the marginal social value of income. To
maximize (15), we can ignore the outer integral to obtain the individual marginal
conditions and then incorporate the impact an individual's choice of miles and size has
on emissions by differentiating the aggregate emissions term with respect to the
individual's m and s.
The resulting first-order conditions for household i are equations (16), shown
in the top of Table II. The first term in each equation represents the individual's money
value of marginal utility from each good. The second term in (16a) represents the
external cost of an additional mile driven by individual i. Similarly, the second term in
(16b) represents the external cost of an additional unit of size purchased by individual i.
The first-order conditions (16) say that the money-metric social marginal utility of each
good equals the social marginal cost of that good. Also, looking at (l6c), note that the
left-hand side equals individual i's change in utility from an additional unit of x,
divided by the marginal utility of income. In other words, it is the dollar value of
another unit of x (the price of x). Since the price of x equals one, (16c) says that the
social marginal utility of income, (5,also equals one.
B. The Household Problem
In contrast to the social planner, a household does not recognize that its own
emissions add to aggregate emissions. The household problem is to maximize:
—(p+t)s —(1+t)x _iEPM(si)mi1 (17)
with respect to in1, s, and x1. The first-order conditions are shown in equations (18)
of Table II. These equations are heterogeneous counterparts to the first-order
conditions (6) of Table I, but without the clean-car and clean-fuel characteristics. In
addition, each consumer has a separate set of optimality conditions.
C. Solutions
1. The Pigovian TaxTable II: First-Order Conditions with Heterogeneous Consumers

























Tosolve for a Pigovian tax, set all taxes except teequalto zero (ts=tg=tx=O).
Then, using ô =1,(16c) and (18c) match each other. Also using ö =1,set (16a) and
(18a) equal to each other. The household-specific variables drop out, leaving:
t=-MED (19)
Using ô =1and this value of tc, then first-order conditions for size (16b) and (18b),
also match each other.
Thus, given the weights we have chosen, a uniform Pigovian tax on emissions
by itself induces all households, no matter their tastes for miles and size, to drive the
optimal number of miles in the right sized cars. Of course, policy makers do not
necessarily weight households so that income to one is the same as income given to
another. They may want instead to incorporate explicit distributional concerns into
environmental taxes. In this paper, however, we are not concerned with issues of
distribution. We weight households simply in a way that implies that the maximization
of social welfare yields the standard Pigovian formula in (19). This first-best uniform
Pigovian tax can be used as a benchmark to identify other first-best policy instruments,
and more importantly, against which to evaluate other second-best instruments.
2. First-best Taxes on Gasoline and Size
As in the representative-agent model, when a Pigovian tax is not possible (te =
0), we can derive another first-best set of instruments. Using the solution technique
explained in Section I.C, we obtain the heterogeneous counterpart of the gasoline tax:
t81 =njtEPM(s1)MPG(s1) (20)
The subscript i on size indicates that the first-best tax on gasoline would have to differ
across consumers according to their chosen size (si). In order for the FBSO to be
attained, the tax on gasoline must differ according to characteristics of the vehicle at the
pump. Such a gas tax would be costly to administer.19
19"Forexample, a tamper-resistant computer code would likely be required on each automobile;
similarly, gasoline pumps would have to be equipped to automatically tack the appropriate tax onto any-18-
Withheterogeneous consumers, the size tax is also household-specific:2°
t.= n/JEPMrn +n/1EPM(s)MPGS11n, (21) SI SI
!vJPG(s1)
To implement this tax on a car of size s, its miles would have to be known. If the size
tax were assessed when the vehicle is purchased, then some measure of the discounted
total expected miles for the life of the vehicle would be necessary. Since conditions
change, however, the one time size tax would not provide the right subsequent
incentives (e.g. retirement). If the size tax were assessed yearly, then annual odometer
readings would be necessary. This would provide incentive for individuals to roll back
their odometers.2'
These results can be reconciled with those of limes (1996). He does not solve
for first-best tax rates on gasoline or car characteristics that would replicate the effects
of an emissions tax, but he finds that the outcome would include a fuel-content
standard, an auto-specific fuel tax, and no regulation of the automobile (p. 226). We
derive the auto-specific fuel tax (in 20), but we also find a mileage-specific auto tax (in
21). This difference in results can be attributed directly to differences between the
models. The consumer's optimization problem in (17) writes MPG and EPM
explicitly as functions of s1 ,butit treats tax rates as parameters that are fixed to the
consumer. Yet (20) says that the optimal tisnpEPM (s )MPG(s1),afunction of s.
if we plug that tgifunctioninto (17) before we differentiate with respect to S,then
additional terms in the first order condition (1 8b) would involve derivatives EPM5 and
MPGS1, just like in (21). The tax on size in (21) would then be unnecessary (Innes,
1996). In other words, results depend on what consumers are assumed to know. If
gasoline that is dispensed to a particular automobile. Moreover, since a simple siphoning of gas will
permit consumers to bypass taxes on high-emission vehicles, the scope for abuse, particularly among
those high-emitting consumers who are arguably the most important targets of the tax, would be
tremendous" (Innes, 1996: p. 226).
20
Again,the FBSOrequiresthat government know nzj ,inorder to set the baseline ni in (21), but that
the individual face a fixed t, that does not depend on individual choice of in (the individual
optimization of (17) does not take a derivative of r, with respect to in).
21"Evenif only a small proportion of consumers cheat in this way, those who cheat are likely to be those
who drive the most, who therefore have the greatest incentive to cheat and who are arguably the most
important targets of mileage taxation" (Innes, 1996: p. 226-227).-19-
individualsknow that their individualized gas tax rate will depend on their own choice
of engine size, then that gas tax alone can induce the optimal size. Preliminary
regression results indicate that the effect of size on EPM may be important. We find
that emissions per mile are a U-shaped function of engine size.22
Successful implementation of these first-best policies seems unlikely.
Therefore, we next assume that policy is limited. If the gas tax cannot be made to
depend on vehicle type, then a separate tax on size becomes important. If both the size
tax and the gas tax are constrained to be uniform across consumers, and therefore fixed
to each consumer, then how should these rates be set? Since the tax rates in (20) and
(21) depend on s and m, one possibility is that the size and gas tax could be calculated
from (20) and (21) using the mean size and miles. How well these uniform tax rates
would perform depends on the technological relationships EPM(s) and MPG(s) and
the relationship in preferences between size and miles. In the next section, we fmd
conditions that characterize second-best (uniform) tax rates. Then, we discuss how
these rates might compare with those from (20) and (21) using mean size and miles.
ifi.Second-BestTaxes on Gasoline and Size
To fmd the second-best tax rates, we must find the single (uniform) gas tax rate
and single size tax rate that maximize social welfare, taking as given households'
demand behavior for miles, size, and the composite commodity. Assuming producer
prices are fixed, this is equivalent to maximizing this weighted sum of indirect utilities:
22Becausean extensive literature search did riot yield satisfactory estimates of the effect of engine size on
emissions per mile, we use data from the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to obtain our own
estimates. The CARB tested the CO. HC, and NOX emissions of 342 gasoline-powered passenger cars,
light-duty trucks and medium duty vehicles of model years 1962 through 1995 (CARB, 1997). Emissions
per mile of the three pollutants appear to first decrease in CID, then increase, in convex U-shapes. This
log-log fitted regression for CO is typical (standard errors in parentheses):
InCO =34.24—13.281nCID +1.361nCID2 R2 .14 ,n=342
(8.89) (3.43) (.33)
Regressions that include dummy variables for light trucks and medium-duty vehicles differ little from this





with respect to t5 and tg.Asa normalization, the tax on x can be set to zero, as in the
first-best scenario.23 Using Roy's Identity, this maximization results in the first order
conditions:
jjj-tf f5[A(t5 )}i(cx, I,
Y)aaa/3Y}1(a
/3, y)aaJ3y = (23a) afiy a/Jy




where,(forj = s, g):
A(t1) gMPG(s)EPM3 —+gEPM(s)MPG-+EPM(s)MPG(s)-
(24)
The chosen quantities (s, g, and x) as well as the marginal utility of income (A) are
functionsof a and ft.In(23a), the first term in the integral (-As/A *) represents the
change in welfare from a change in the size tax, holding aggregate emissions constant.
The second term, involving A(t), is the change in utility due to the effect that a size tax
has on aggregate emissions.24 Similarly, the first term in (23b) is the change in welfare
from a change in the gas tax, holding aggregate emissions constant. The second term
incorporates the change in welfare from the effect that the gas tax has on aggregate
emissions.
Thus the tax rates on size and gasoline should each be set so that the aggregate
marginal gain in private welfare equals the aggregate loss from the effect on emissions.
As shown in the A(t3) term of each first order condition, the extent to which emissions
are reduced depends on the degree of responsiveness of miles and size to taxes on size
and gasoline. Thus second-best optimal (SBO) tax rates on size and gasoline depend on
23
Income,y, is exogenous, so a (lump-sum) tax on income tisequivalent to a tax on all commodities
at the same rate; any set of (tx, t,t) canbe scaled up or down, with commensurate changes in t,.Thus
any one rate can be set to zero (see Fullerton, 1997).-21-
the elasticities of demand for these goods. But the way in which changes in size affect
emissions is through the technological relationships that size has with emissions per
mile and fuel efficiency. The functions EPM(s) and MPG(s) are therefore major
determinants of the second-best tax rates.
These first order conditions cannot be used to solve for the second-best uniform
tax rates on size and gasoline. To find closed-form solutions we would have to specify
the functional forms of h(a ,fi, y),EPM(s), MPG(s) and the demands for size, miles,
and the composite commodity. Still, these first order conditions can be used to shed
some light on the nature of such taxes. First, note how this problem differs from the
usual second-best optimal tax problem. Much of the public economics literature
assumes that consumers demand leisure and other goods, that leisure cannot be taxed,
and that the government must set other tax rates to minimize excess burden subject to a
revenue requirement. The resulting second-best tax rates depend primarily on price
elasticities: higher tax rates are placed on goods that are inelastically demanded or that
are complements to leisure.25 In contrast, our problem does not involve any
labor/leisure choice, or even a revenue requirement. Individual-specific lump-sum
taxes are available. For this reason, the resulting second-best tax rates will not depend
in the same way on behavioral responses to prices. The goal here, instead, is to tax
something that approximates the consumers emissions. In particular, if consumers with
a high preference for miles (high a) also happen to have a high preference for size (high
,8), then that correlation is likely to affect the second-best optimal tgandta..
addition, preferences for size determine emissions through the relationship size has with
MPG and EPM.
We therefore want to investigate the potential importance of these technological
relationships and of the correlation between miles and size. In addition, first order
conditions (23) do not provide clear guidance about how to set uniform tax rates in the
face of heterogeneity. Closed-form solutions for the SBO tax rates are not available,
but two alternatives come to mind. First, we can calculate the "expected value" or
24Whenan emissions tax achieves the FBSO,whereA =A",then (23a) says that the cost to the taxpayer
of an increase in t,isthe amount of spurchased,and that this marginal cost should be equal to the
marginal benefits in terms of reduced emissions.-22-
weighted average of the first-best individual-specific tax rates in equations (20) and
(21). These average rates might then be applied uniformly to all individuals. These
rates are not the same as the SBO rates from (23), but at least they incorporate
information about the distribution h(a, ft,y)of heterogeneous individuals. Second,
policymakers might simply ignore heterogeneity, and just use the economy-wide means
for miles and size as if all individuals were the same. A comparison of these two
alternatives will reveal the direction of the bias from ignoring heterogeneity.
The average of all different gas tax rates in (20) is:






We ask how this concept differs from the simple calculation of the gas tax rate for the
person with average choices:
t9 ()=nEPM()MPG() (26)
Specifically, we want to identify the circumstances under which the average of the gas
tax in (25) is greater than the gas tax rate for the person with average choices in (26).
We can thus discover the conditions under which uniform taxes based on average
choices would likely fall short of attaining the second-best emissions reduction.
Note that households with bigger cars driving proportionally more miles than
small-car owners would pay a proportionally higher gas tax even with a uniform gas tax
rate, because they would use more gas to drive the extra miles. Whether (25) exceeds
(26) depends on the characteristics of EPM(s) and MPG(s) and particularly on the
convexity of each function. Convexity of EPM(s), for example, would mean that
increases in size increase emissions per mile at an increasing rate. This would raise the
25Forcomprehensive treatments of optimal taxation, see Auerbach (1985) or Stern (1987).-23-
weightedaverage using EPM(s) in (25) relative to the tax rate using average size in
(26). Convexity in MPG(s) also raises (25) relative to (26). So, if either function is
sufficiently convex (or if both are convex), then the use of average size to calculate the
gas tax rate would understate the second-best uniform tax rate. Conversely, if either
EPM(s) or MPG(s) is sufficiently concave, then using the average value of size to
calculate the gas tax rate would overstate the second-best uniform tax rate.
To determine the likely magnitude of (25) relative to (26), we need estimates of
the possible nonlinear effect of engine size on fuel efficiency and emissions. While it is
widely known that fuel efficiency decreases with engine size, a literature search locates
no statistical estimates of the nonlinear nature of this relationship. Nor could we fmd
any estimates of the effect of size on emissions per mile.26 For these reasons, we use
the CARB data to estimate EPM and MPG as polynomial functions of engine size.
These regressions omit other explanatory variables in order to capture the full effect of
size, the only taxed characteristic. These very preliminary results suggest that EPM is
increasing over most of the range of size and convex, while MPG is decreasing and
also convex in size.27 Thus the use of average car size would likely understate the
second-best optimal gas tax.
Now consider the individual-specific size tax rate in (21). We want to reveal the
circumstances under which the average of the size tax rate,




islarger than the size tax for the person with the average choices,
Dunleep (1992) provides only rough estimates of the effect of size on MPG. Kahn (1996b) examines
the effect of size on emissions in parts per million rather than on emissions per mile.
27
Typicalresults for regressions of EPM on size are shown in footnote (22). The following regression




EPA data on MPG yield similar results.-24-
- — — n/iEPM()MPG-ñi t(s,m)=njiEPM-m+ (28) 5'
MPG(s)
lithe size tax is positive, then emissions per mile increase proportionately more
with size than fuel efficiency deteriorates, and the first terms in (27) and (28) dominate
the second terms. In this case, whether the average size tax rate (27) exceeds the size
tax rate using average miles and size (in 28) depends only on whether the first term in
(27) exceeds the first term in (28). Note that in the first term of each equation, EPMS
is multiplied by m. If size and miles are positively correlated, because a and fiare
positively correlated, then this term is superadditive in miles and size. In this case, even
if EPM(s) is linear, (27) exceeds (28). The use of the average person's size tax is likely
to understate the second-best size tax, if those who own larger cars drive
proportionately more miles than those with smaller cars. Moreover, if EPM is a
convex function of size, then the optimal size tax increases even more quickly with
miles and size. Conversely, if miles and size are negatively correlated and EPM is
linear or concave in size, then (27) would be less than (28),
We use the 1994 Residential Transportation Energy Consumption Survey
(RTECS) to find preliminary evidence on the correlation of size and miles, and fmd a
very small but statistically significant negative correlation.28 However, since
preliminary estimates show EPM(s) to be convex, we cannot determine whether the
size tax based on average size would likely overstate or understate the second-best
uniform size tax.
Do uniform tax rates calculated using mean miles and size and (20) and (21)
approximate the second-best tax rates? We have shown that the answer depends on the
technological relationships EPM(s) and MPG(s), and the relationship between
preferences for size and miles h(a, fi,y).The average gas tax is likely to exceed the tax
calculated using average size, since EPM and MPG are found to be convex in size.
The average size tax may exceed the size tax calculated using average size and miles,
28Weuse the RTECS because other sources lack data on annual miles or engine size. CARB data does
not list annual mileage, while the Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey (NPTS) has annual miles
but not engine size. The 1994 Consumer Expenditure Survey has multiple odometer readings that enable
mileage to be calculated, and it has the number of cylinders, but not CID, Using vehicles in the RTECS,-25-
butonly if size and miles are positively correlated and/or EPM is sufficiently convex in
size. In contrast, if tastes for size and miles are independently distributed and emissions
per mile and miles per gallon are linear functions of size, then average tax rates equal
the tax rates calculated using mean miles and size.
It appears unlikely that the second-best uniform tax rates would be closely
approximated by the rates based on the means. In order to maximize social welfare, we
need a comprehensive empirical investigation of the technological relationships
EPM(s) and MPG(s), the distribution h(a,fl,y), and behavioral parameters.
IV. Conclusions
In a simple model, we duplicate the outcome from a tax on emissions by instead
taxing gasoline and engine size, and by subsidizing PCE. The gas tax induces
households to drive fewer miles and to buy more fuel-efficient cars. In addition, since
the rate of tax depends on the cleanliness of the gasoline, the optimal gas tax also
encourages households to buy cleaner fuel. The tax on size induces households to buy
cars with smaller engines, while a subsidy to PCE encourages purchase and repair of
emissions-reducing equipment. Of course, vehicle age is also an important determinant
of emissions, because emissions standards have become increasingly stringent over
time, because emissions-control equipment deteriorates over time, and because new
technologies and lighter materials have become available. Thus policies that accelerate
vehicle retirement might also reduce emissions in a cost-effective way. The theory in
this paper could be extended to incorporate such policies.29
Current policies for the control of car pollution already involve many
government mandates, in addition to some economic incentives. We do not include any
explicit vehicle-emissions standards in our model, but we recognize that existing
standards affect the current relationships between vehicle size, vehicle age, and
thecorrelationbetween CID and annual miles is -.0439,significantat the2.6%level. Also, regression
analysis indicates that miles and size may be nonlinearly related.
29
Alberini,et a!., (1995, 1996) derive a theoretical model of owners' car tenure and scrappage decisions,
and they analyze the results from an experimental vehicle retirement program in Delaware. Innes (1996)
and Fullerton and West (1999) also incorporate vintage choice into their models.-26-
emissionsper mile. Thus incentives that affect the choice of vehicle rely for their
effectiveness on the existence of those standards.
While the model of homogeneous consumers is useful to clarify the role of each
alternative policy m attaining the social optimum, it cannot tell us how variation in
tastes for miles and size might affect optimal tax or subsidy rates. To explore this issue,
we build a model of consumers that differ by tastes for miles and engine size. The first-
best alternative policies are household-specific taxes on gasoline and size. For the first-
best gas tax to be feasible, the attributes of each vehicle would have to be identifiable at
the pump.
Because such implementation would likely be expensive, we characterize
second-best uniform tax rates. A simple alternative is based on the erroneous
assumption that consumers are identical and so all drive the mean number of miles in
the mean sized car. We reach two main conclusions. First, if the addition of a unit of
size increases emissions per mile at an increasing rate, or if it decreases fuel efficiency
at a decreasing rate, then a second-best uniform gas tax rate would exceed that simple
calculation (using mean size and miles). Second, because we identify consumer
preferences using two parameters, one for miles and one for size, we find that a higher
positive correlation of these taste parameters increases the second-best uniform tax on
size.
If tastes for miles and size are positively correlated, and EPM and MPG are
convex in size, then second-best uniform tax rates are likely to be larger than tax rates
calculated by ignoring heterogeneity (using the means of size and miles). Only if tastes
are independently distributed and both EPM and MPG are linear would the tax rates
evaluated at the means be optimal. Thus an investigation of the economic incentives for
the control of car pollution requires empirical exploration of the technological
relationships between vehicle attributes and emissions per mile, and of the distribution
of preferences for miles and size.References
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